

Strategy Research Project

Leading Change: Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP)

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Abstract

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Since 2004, The Department of the Army has been required to provide an annual report on sexual assault. The Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) office has been the lead agent for the report and program. Over the years, the SHARP office has gone through several organizational changes due to Department of Defense directed mandates and internal Army decisions. This paper examined the Army's SHARP program from 2004 to 2011 by using Kotter's eight-step process of creating major change in an organization. This examination of Army decisions and programs within each of the eight steps showed that the Army has made many significant improvements to address this issue and anchor these changes within its culture. In concluding, this paper provided recommendations in four areas related to formally developing a vision for the SHARP program and using additional ways to communicate the vision and programs to members of the active Army and more specifically to the Reserve Component.

Leading Change: Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP)

Sexual assault has been on the rise in the military since 2004, but over the last three years, reporting has stabilized at approximately 3,200 cases.¹ Secretary of Defense Panetta stated in 2012 that sexual assault cases have been unreported by approximately 16,000; hence, the problem may be much greater than what has been documented.² None of the military services have escaped scandals, public humiliation, and embarrassment to some degree. Over the years, Congress has conducted hearings on this issue and required annual reports by the military Services since 2005. According to a 2011 Newsweek report under the title The Military Secret Shame, one out of five females and one out of fifteen males in the United States military have been sexually assaulted by other service members.³ What makes sexual assault even more difficult to understand is that the military as an institution has always prided itself on taking care of its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. Military service leaders have articulated the importance of justice, morality, equality, and family values. In essence, sexual harassment and sexual assault violates the tenants of the military Services' core values. The Army bases its foundation for conduct on seven core values, which are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless-service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. When Soldiers swear into the military, these values are embedded in each member over time and become the standard for behavior.⁴ Whether they are on duty or off duty, Soldiers are required to be professional, respectful, and exemplify the highest military deportment. The Army expects Soldiers to live the seven core values throughout their military service. A leader's inherent responsibilities for upholding the Army values connote that sexual harassment and sexual assault complaints will be addressed

expeditiously with fairness and impartiality. These values are an integral part in the prevention of sexual harassment and sexual assault. General Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, in addressing this issue stated “. . . this conduct impacts all members of the Army family. The bedrock of our Army is trust and we cannot violate this trust so preventing these actions are key to creating a stronger Army for tomorrow. We must protect our team members. . . We will stop these crimes and together we will be Army Strong.”⁵

Army Regulation 600-20 makes it clear that “Sexual assault is a criminal offense and has no place in the Army.”⁶ In addition to the criminal element, sexual assault in the military breaks down the fabric of the organization. It breeds anger, mistrust, fear, and extreme financial distress. Commanders at all levels have the principal responsibility of ensuring appropriate care of victims, as well as investigating and holding accountable those who have committed the alleged act. Soldiers must feel confident in their leadership, and they must know that there are mechanisms that will address the offense, provide them privacy, and protect them against reprisal, harassment, and ridicule once they report the incident.

In addressing the complexities associated with sexual assault in the Army, this paper will first discuss the linkage of the Defense Department’s 2004 assessment of sexual assault in the military overall and its influence on the Army’s program. Then it will examine key aspects of the Army’s program to determine if it has been successful in executing this guidance. This examination will be based on the leadership principles outlined in John Kotter’s book, *Leading Change*. In his book, Kotter professes that producing successful change of any magnitude in an organization consists of an eight-stage change process. These steps are: “establishing a sense of urgency, creating the

guiding coalition, developing a vision and strategy, communicating the change vision, empowering broad based action, generating short term wins, consolidating gains and producing more change, and anchoring new approaches in culture.”⁷ From this assessment, the paper will provide recommendations to enhance the Army’s efforts in improving its current program and changing their institutional culture to better address sexual assault issues.




Figure 1. Army Sexual Assault Reports by Year⁸

Background

Since the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2005, all military Services have been required to provide Congress with an annual report on sexual assaults.⁹ Since calendar year (CY) 2004, the numbers of restricted and unrestricted

reports have increased in the Services in general and more specially in the Army. However, over the past three years the number of reports in the Army has stabilized between 1689 and 1795. Restricted reporting allows the victim to give details of the assault to specifically identified personnel and receive medical treatment without triggering the official investigation process. Unrestricted reports start an official investigation, which is reported through the current reporting channels such as the chain of command, law enforcement, and Sexual Assault Response Coordinator.¹⁰ Figure 1 on the next page depicts the increase of reporting from 2004 to 2011 within the Army under restrictive and unrestricted reporting.

In February 2004, former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld directed the Under Secretary for Defense and Readiness, Dr. David Chu, to review all sexual assault policies and programs among the Services.¹¹ The request for inquiry stemmed from the increase of sexual assault cases on Service members in deployment zones and media reports of criticism of leaders for not taking the issue seriously.¹² Dr. Chu quickly took action and directed the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Health, Protection and Readiness, to assemble a task force to address the SECDEF's concerns.¹³ Since 2004, there have been many surveys conducted, all of which provides a myriad of information pertaining to sexual assault. These reports gave insight to committees, task forces, program managers, and Commanders on demographics such as age, race, gender, commonalities in geographical locations, and general or common elements surrounding the incident. One day after the Department of Defense (DoD) published their memorandum to initiate a task force, Acting Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) Les Brownlee directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army,

Manpower and Reserve Affairs, to establish a task force. The newly established Army Task Force on Sexual Assault Policies was tasked to accomplish the following:

- Conduct a detailed review of the effectiveness of the Army's policies on reporting and addressing allegations of sexual assault
- Review the current processes to ensure a climate in which victims feel free to report allegations and in which leaders understand their responsibilities to support victims and to investigate allegations
- Recommend changes or additions to current policies, programs, and procedures to provide clear guidance for reporting and addressing sexual assault allegations and establishing effective protocols for victim support.¹⁴

From this review, the Task Force recommendations were designed to: 1) create a policy focused on education, prevention, victim support, investigation process, reporting, and feedback; 2) implement training that integrates sexual assault topics with Army values and include the Army values into all leadership and human relations training; 3) establish a program structure to provide support to victims through Victim Advocates (VA) and Victim Advocate Coordinators; 4) establish a system of documentation, assessment, reporting, and program improvements at the installation, major command, and Headquarters, Department of the Army levels.¹⁵ The Army's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program (SAPR) was formally established in 2005 to achieve those four areas just identified. Overall, the Army policy promotes sensitive care and confidential reporting for victims of sexual assault and accountability for those who commit sexual assault crimes.

In December 2008, the Army, Chief of Staff and CSA directed the SAPR office to reorganize. Due to sexual harassment incidents having the potential to escalate to sexual assault incidents, SAPR absorbed the Military Prevention of Sexual Harassment and Civilian Prevention of Sexual Harassment programs.¹⁶ The new division then

became the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Office.¹⁷

The SHARP office has gone through several changes throughout the years due to DoD directed mandates and internal Army decisions, but their goals, which are summarized below, have essentially remained the same:

- Create a climate that minimizes sexual assault incidents which impact all Army personnel and family members
- Create a climate that encourages the victim to report incidents of sexual assault without fear of retaliation
- Establish sexual assault training and awareness programs to educate Soldiers
- Ensure sensitive and comprehensive treatment to restore victims' health and well-being
- Ensure leaders understand their roles and responsibilities and thoroughly investigate allegations of sexual assault and take appropriate administrative and disciplinary actions¹⁸

Assessment of Leading Change: Sexual Assault Program

Going through major change in an organization is not an easy task; however, having a formal process to help leaders implement that change can minimize mistakes that contribute to unsuccessful results. Consequently, in the book *Leading Change*, Kotter describes an eight-stage process, mentioned earlier, that will guide an organization through a significant change process. Kotter developed this well-recognized and logical step-by-step process to show strategic level leaders how to maneuver through major change by describing what to address in a sequential manner

as they attempt to transform their organization. This paper will now examine the key aspects of the Army's SHARP program by using this eight-step process to identify both successes and areas where the Army can improve.

Step 1: Establishing a Sense of Urgency

Kotter's first step to creating change in an organization is to create a sense of urgency. Establishing a sense of urgency is crucial because it will set the foundation for stakeholders, leaders, and subordinates to focus on the change process and reduce the potential for complacency. If leaders do not sufficiently express a sense of urgency, then those who are involved in the change process will lose the momentum for change and will fall short of the finish line.¹⁹

Former SECDEF Rumsfeld first generated a sense of urgency when he directed a review of how the Department of Defense handled the treatment and care of victims of sexual assault in 2004. The former SECDEF had the authority and creditability to convince leaders in all branches of the military that they needed to deal with this important problem at all organizational levels. According to Rumsfeld, "Commanders at every level have a duty to take appropriate steps to prevent sexual assaults, protect victims, and hold those who commit offenses accountable."²⁰

Kotter states that crises, potential crises, or major opportunities must be identified and discussed when establishing a sense of urgency.²¹ Addressing organizational issues early on allows managers and leaders to curtail major fallouts, such as emotional or professional issues within the organizational structure. Leaders, who are proactive in addressing employee issues right away, are forward thinking and tend to create the best working environment for their employees and promote equality within their organizational levels. This same thought pattern carries over into the

military. During CY2004, the Army filed 725 sexual assault reports, and this catapulted a need for action.²² In essence, “The Army senior leadership’s establishment of the Task Force emphasizes its commitment to Soldiers.”²³

Acting SECARMY Brownlee and several leaders, who saw a potential crisis due to the rising number of sexual harassment and sexual assault incidents in the military, initiated a proactive response by requesting a task force to look into the matter.

Between the Army’s SHARP (formerly SARP) office, the Army Task Force on Sexual Assault Policies, and senior leaders’ focus, the right people in the right organizations were working together to find ways to combat sexual assault in the Army. This proper sense of urgency throughout the Army was evident by their proactive actions, and this leads to Kotter’s second step, which is creating a guiding coalition.

Step 2: Creating the Guiding Coalition

One individual cannot change an organization; therefore, it is important to build a coalition filled with those who believe change is necessary and are proficient in their fields. A strong coalition must have members with a shared objective and the right mix of core personnel in order to be effective.²⁴ Effective coalition members should have four key characteristics identified as position power, expertise, credibility, and leadership.²⁵ It is also important for the coalition to have a good mix of both leaders and managers for a coalition made up of only managers is doomed to be unsuccessful. In essence, leaders focus on developing the vision and visualizing the future horizon, while managers focus more on the processes of turning that vision into to a reality within the organization.²⁶

Over the years, the SHARP office has worked actively to address sexual harassment and sexual assaults. It has been lead agent in the guiding coalition to

implement the necessary changes to be more effective in addressing the many complexities associated with this issue. The SHARP program relies on experts within the program office, as well as stakeholders from external organizations. The current SHARP office is composed of subject matter experts in the following three branches: Plans and Operations, Strategic Communications, and Prevention and Training. They coordinate extensively with an array of external stakeholders, which include the Deputy Chief of Staff G-1, Training and Doctrine Command, law enforcement agencies, Office of the Surgeon General, Office of the Chaplain, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Inspector General, Chief, National Guard Bureau, Chief, U.S. Army Reserves, Commanders of major Army Commands, and Installation Agencies.²⁷ In theory, the SHARP office with input from the stakeholders was the guiding coalition; therefore, this second step was executed properly. Leaders, in concert with the guiding coalition, should then create a vision and strategy for the Army, which is Kotter's third step for major change for leaders to execute.

Step 3: Developing a Vision and Strategy

Change can be difficult to embed within the organization if there is not a vision and a strategy in place to articulate the future and accomplish the goals leaders have set. A vision can spark motivation, keeps projects focused on a desired end state, and provides the overall focus for changes within an organization. Kotter proposes that by clarifying the vision, it simplifies the direction of change, as well as motivates and fosters unity of effort towards the direction of change.²⁸ A vision should provide a clear and concise picture of what the organization is striving to become in the future. Strategic leaders have the responsibility of collaborating with others within the organization when creating the vision. One person cannot do it alone because

individuals may not have enough insight based on their own experience to formulate a vision. Further, when others collaborate it allows for greater organization acceptance of the vision. Once the leader in concert with the guiding coalition cultivates the vision, then the development of strategies and plans can begin.²⁹

The SHARP program did not complete this step because they do not have a clearly articulated vision statement. At the time this article was written, SHARP has not clearly identified their vision. They do state a purpose that refers to reinforcing the Army's commitment to eliminate sexual assault as discussed in AR 600-20, but my research shows there is not a document available that clearly defines the program's vision. The purpose of the SHARP program centers on awareness and prevention, training and education, victim advocacy, response, reporting, and accountability.³⁰ The stated purpose is more a mission statement because it conveys what the program will do. Conversely, a vision must focus on where the program should strive to achieve in the future.

The lack of a clear vision did not stop the SHARP program leadership from launching a comprehensive sexual assault strategy that focused on ends, ways and means are the key components of strategy.³¹ The SHARP strategy key ends, or goals as they called, were to reduce assaults by increasing preventive measures and increase the propensity for victims to report. The strategy's key ways were to utilize a four-phase approach summarized as: Phase I: Committed Army Leadership, Phase II: Army-Wide Conviction, Phase III: Achieve Cultural Change, Phase IV: Sustainment, Refinement, and Sharing.³² The strategy's key means were to empower all service members to take action in an effort to reduce sexual assault.³³ My research shows that the strategy was

overall suitable, feasible, and acceptable. Once the strategy is developed by the guiding coalition, the next step in Kotter's process is communicating this strategy.

Step 4: Communicating the Change Vision and Strategy

Gaining an understanding and a commitment to a new direction by an organization's members can be difficult; therefore, it is important for leaders to send a clear message to all its members. Communication works best when it is simply, direct, and jargon free. Kotter stresses several key elements when trying to communicate the vision effectively. They include simplicity, using metaphors, analogies, multiple forums, and repetition.³⁴

Even though SHARP leaders had not specified a specific vision as discussed earlier, they have been effectively communicating the program's goals, which is a key part of any strategy. The Army has come up with several ways to communicate this strategy in a variety of media. In September 2008, during the Risk Reduction Training Summit, the SECARMY introduced the I. A.M. (Intervene-Act-Motivate) Strong campaign. This prevention campaign promoted the idea that all Soldiers should take action to eliminate sexual assault.³⁵ For example, the I. A.M. Strong campaign uses a mnemonic device to remind Soldiers to **I**ntervene, **A**ct, and **M**otivate as a peer-to-peer message that included bystander intervention. The SHARP office marketing team developed radio and television commercials that are broadcasted on the Armed Forces Network and some local stations. Units also have materials such as posters, banners, and pocket guides placed around their work areas. With the emergence of more technically savvy Soldiers in the Army, the SHARP office has ventured into utilizing social media.³⁶

For the last few years, the SHARP program has sponsored the Soldier Show and the Army Concert Tour. The Soldier Show is a showcase of Army talent that performs annually at installations. During the show, I. A.M. Strong commercials are featured during the performances. The Army Concert Tour highlights performances by various professional artists.³⁷ These shows occur on Army installations, resulting in a predominantly active duty audience. For the most part, Army Reserve and National Guard units are not located on an Army installation, which means a substantial number of the Army population is not being reached because of where the shows are performed.

The SHARP program also uses various avenues such as training teams, conferences, and self-study as a way to communicate the strategy to different levels of Army personnel. For example, SHARP uses a Mobile Training Team to teach a mandatory 80-hour certification course to Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC) and Victim Advocates from all Army component military and civilian personnel.³⁸ The Army incorporated the use of Digital Video Disc's (DVD) and support packages to train unit members. The "Soldier Training" DVD depicts real world situations for Soldiers and Civilians and is part of the mandatory annual training. Perhaps the training video developers could add scenes from the documentary "The Invisible War"³⁹ for more effective realism. Scenes from this documentary can provide a realistic viewpoint from a victim's perspective. Prior to conducting unit training, leaders must view "Leader Training," which was developed to train leaders how to train their personnel on Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Prevention. Installations use the third video, "Amateur Night", during inprocessing and orientation of new personnel. Segments from the

“Soldier Training” video DVD integrated into the unit’s annual training video. The last part of training is an interactive video entitled “Team Bond.” Participants become lead characters in various vignettes and make choices on how to react to different sexual assault and sexual harassment scenes.⁴⁰

On September 9, 2008, the Army SHARP team hosted its first Sexual Assault Prevention and Risk Reduction Training Summit with over 250 attendees present from various internal and external agencies such as Congress, DoD, and national subject matter experts. This was a significant event for the Army’s program. The purpose of the summit was to unveil Phase I (Committed Army Leadership) of the I. A.M. Strong campaign, while providing attendees best practices and the opportunity to develop a command action plan.⁴¹ The presence of nearly 70 General Officers signified the importance of supporting a strategy to reduce sexual assault and sexual harassment in the Army. The summit has now become an annual event that receives high visibility from senior leaders on the importance of SHARP. The Army not only communicates internally within the organization, but they also got the message out to external audiences such as congress and the public. As part of Phase I, the SECARMY and other senior leaders addressed members of Congress and media outlets in an effort to articulate the Army’s Prevention message. Most recently, the active Army and Army National Guard have utilized their Annual Posture Statement as a mean to promote the SHARP message to internal and external audiences, both military and civilian.⁴² The Army Reserve did not address the issue in their 2012 posture statement; therefore, they missed an opportunity to use an excellent strategic document to communicate to audiences inside and outside the organization.⁴³

Statistics show that “one out of three reported sexual assaults within the Army are preceded by sexual assault.”⁴⁴ According to my research, the Army does not conduct mandatory prevention training for those assailants who have committed sexual harassment or any sexual misconduct incident and remain in the service. From a different behavior perspective, the Army assists substance-impaired Soldiers who have the potential for continued military service.⁴⁵ Therefore, in the future the Army can adopt this approach and develop a prevention training program for individuals who may have the potential to escalate from sexual harassment to assault.

Overall my examination has shown that even though the Army has not clearly stated a vision for the SHARP program, they have applied Kotter’s key elements of communicating the strategy’s goals. While some improvements were identified, they have successfully executed this step. As discussed, the Army has been innovative in using various resources to communicate the message of their prevention strategy to all levels of personnel by using an array of internal media to the organization, as well as to those who are external. However, an area where communication improvement is needed is related to the Reserve Force. Since the Reserve Component is geographically dispersed, the need to use social and broadcast media as a way to communicate the SHARP message is important. To better address this audience, perhaps more frequent broadcast of commercials in various sized markets would be appropriate. In addition, the SHARP Facebook page needs to promote more page activity.⁴⁶ Currently the page has only 15 group members and limited activity. Overall, the Army’s senior leaders at the highest level have participated in SHARP related events, which stress the importance of the cause to all subordinates and non-military

audiences. Getting leaders on board is an important step towards empowering broad-based action, which is Kotter's fifth step.

Step 5: Empowering Broad-Based Action

Taking action and moving in a positive direction is the right path for any organization that wants to grow; however, the next key step is that leaders must empower people within the organization at multiple levels. Leaders must gain their buy-in for broad-based action to take root. Major internal transformation rarely happens unless many people assist.⁴⁷ Leaders must ensure they remove doubt and fear concerning the organization's goals by building trust among its members and between upper and lower management.

In a recent interview, SECDEF Leon Panetta commented that he believes the estimate for sexual assault cases throughout the military Services is closer to 19,000, which is in contrast to the 3,191 reports that were reported for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011.⁴⁸ The difference in the reporting numbers could be because victims feel a lack of confidence in how the leaders deal with sexual assault cases. Victims also may feel a sense of embarrassment or fear of retaliation. While these might be valid reasons for the not reporting, it is imperative for the Army to continue to make efforts to build confidence in victims so that they will continue to report cases of sexual assault and harassment.

To address this confidence and trust issue, the Army in FY11 has taken actions to improve their investigation and prosecution capabilities by hiring 12 experts to work with sexual assault investigators, prosecutors, and defense counsel to provide advice and training. In addition, Army has retained 23 special investigators and 16 special victim prosecutors on major installations as part of a special unit that mainly focuses on

sexual assault cases. Furthermore, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory employed 33 examiners who specialize in Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) processing.⁴⁹ The increase of these capabilities will show victims that leaders are ensuring that investigations are processed thoroughly and fairly. The DoD has also implemented initiatives that are geared toward victim advocacy, such as mandating that all sexual assault allegations be reported to a special court-martial convening authority, which is usually someone in the rank of a Colonel or Navy Captain. In addition, Reserve Component victims can stay on active duty status until they can obtain the same treatment and support that is available to the active component personnel.

The increase in investigation and legal capabilities and DoD initiatives, which are applicable to the Army, are some examples of how the Army is trying to empower victims to take broad-based action. While there is no measure of the effectiveness of these initiatives at this time, perhaps reporting will continue to rise in the short term due to the removal of some obstacles to reporting and creation of trust. More future analysis of these initiatives are needed to determine their effectiveness as to whether they address Secretary Panetta's concern that there is too much underreporting. The Army has addressed the Secretary's concern in their strategy by predicated an increase in the propensity to report from 50 to 90 percent and a decrease in assaults by 50 percent from FY2009 to FY2013.⁵⁰

Step 6: Generating Short-Term Wins

Transforming an organization is never easy, and it takes time to affect change within people who have thought one way. Hence, short-term wins provide evidence that the guiding coalition is making progress towards their long-term goal as the strategy is

being implemented. Overall, short-term wins must be visible, unambiguous, and clearly related to the change effort.⁵¹

Over the years SHARP has remained committed to their goal of making Solders aware of the reporting options that are available. Because of promoting awareness, reported cases have increased since 2004, but as shown earlier in Figure 1, they have remained constant over the past three years.⁵² As mentioned previously, a successful strategy will show an increase in propensity to report. This short-term win of focusing on reporting shows the coalition members, as well as doubters from outside the organization, that the SHARP is making progress towards that goal. It also provides a way to review the viability of the campaign strategy and allows the coalition to make adjustments to get better results.

Short-term wins can spotlight individual accomplishments as well. In 2009, the Army began recognize one individual, who has provided support to service members, by designating them as SARC of the year. In relation to group recognition, all SARC's and Victim Advocate's, who completed the 80-hour training course, received certification from the National Organization for Victims Advocacy, and effective February 1, 2013 members can receive an additional skill identifier added to their records.⁵³ The energy created from the reaching short-term wins is important because this excitement about change carries over to Kotter's seventh step in the process, which is consolidating gains and producing more change.

Step 7: Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change

Organizations going through change should take the time to enjoy short-term wins, but they cannot linger too long because the change practices are still fragile and have not been engrained into the culture. Kotter's cardinal rule states: "Whenever you

let up before the job is done, critical momentum can be lost, and regression may follow.”⁵⁴ In order to avoid the lost in momentum, leaders and managers need to find ways to use their creditability to change systems, structures, and policies. They can hire, promote, and develop change agents within the organization. Additionally, they can reinvigorate the process by developing new projects, themes, and change agents.⁵⁵ These are the characteristics of a successful major change, and the Army has incorporated many of them throughout the Army process and structure.

The SHARP and their stakeholders have done very well in implementing this step. As mentioned previously, the Army Criminal Investigation Division has hired additional personnel who specialize in sexual investigations. The Army Judge Advocate General Corps (JAGC) has increased training and resources dealing with sexual assault. The JAGC has the approval to hire 23 Special Victim Prosecutors, who focus on sexual assaults and domestic abuse. In addition to the prosecutors, seven civilian experts are providing specialized training to counsel individuals. The Army has invested \$3.5M to support JACG efforts to improve policy development, case management, training, and education.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the introduction of the I. A.M. Strong campaign, discussed earlier, was a testament to Kotter’s concept of reinvigorating the process by using new themes. These two specific examples of consolidating gains and producing more change provide confirmation that step number seven was executed sufficiently, and the SHARP program continues to practice the principles of this step.

Step 8: Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture

The final step in Kotter’s process is anchoring new approaches in the culture. New practices made when transforming an organization are always subject to regression because groups are comfortable with their current culture. Culture is

composed of norms of behavior and shared values that are common in a group, hence organizations have to anchor new approaches in the group norms and values.⁵⁷ Military culture is unique because it is a fusion of tradition, customs, and values that are shared throughout an institution and are supported by unit cohesion. Within this culture lie standards of behavior that include loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and trust.⁵⁸ Since this culture is ingrained at all levels in the Army, leadership at multiple levels plays an important role in changing the military culture as it relates to sexual assault.

Edgar Schein provides concepts to assist leaders in transmitting their message of cultural with the use of primary embedding and reinforcing mechanisms. There are six primary embedding mechanisms that teach an organization how to perceive, think, feel, and behave. These mechanisms are: 1) what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis; 2) how leaders react to incidents and crisis; 3) allocation of resources; 4) role modeling and teaching; 5) techniques for rewarding; 6) employing, fostering, and firing.⁵⁹ Once an organization stabilizes and matures, a second set of culture mechanisms emerge to support the primary mechanisms. These reinforcement mechanisms are: 1) organization design and structure; 2) systems and procedures; 3) rites and rituals; 4) physical space; 5) stories about events and people; 6) stated philosophy, creeds, and charters.⁶⁰ Army leadership has used some of these twelve mechanisms to change the Army's culture as it pertains to sexual harassment and assault.

On an annual basis, the Army is required to submit a report on sexual assault to DoD showing the Army's commitment to reduce incidents, which is related to Schein's

first cultural embedding mechanism of what leaders pay attention to measure. This report consolidates statistical data from every command level on incident reporting and the disposition of how perpetrators are held accountable. This report consolidates statistical data from every command level on incident reporting and the disposition of how perpetrators are held accountable. Since this is a high visibility report, all commanders maintain a stake in trying to mitigate sexual harassment and assault occurrences by maintaining a focus to change their organization's culture.

How leaders react to incidents and crisis is Schein's second cultural embedding mechanism that leaders have practiced at the highest level. As an example, in April 2012 SECDEF Panetta along with support from General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared on Capitol Hill to announce several initiatives to combat the sexual assault. One of the most significant initiatives was the change in incident reporting authority. Incident reporting was elevated to the Colonel level versus the immediate supervisor. Coincidentally, SECDEF Panetta announced these initiatives two days after viewing the award winning film "The Invisible War,"⁶¹ a documentary that highlights the epidemic of sexual assault within the military.

The paper's earlier discussion in the short-term wins section association with providing additional resources to hire more experts, investigators and DNA examiners, is clearly an example of the Army applying Schein's third cultural embedding mechanism of allocating resources. Further, Senior Army leadership's involvement at the SHARP Summits, discussed in the paper's communicating the strategy section, supports Schein's fourth cultural embedding mechanism of role modeling. Senior leader attendance and participation sends a clear message of leading by example, as

well as supporting the previously discussed mechanism of what leaders pay attention to.

In order for embedding mechanisms to be effective in changing culture, reinforcement mechanisms are necessary. The reporting, now required by the Army and discussed earlier, is related Schein's second cultural reinforcing mechanism of changing an organization's systems and procedures. The paper's earlier discussion in the communicating the strategy section about rewarding and recognizing SARC and Victim Advocates supports Schein's fifth cultural reinforcing mechanisms of stories about events and people. The Army also displays the cultural reinforcing mechanism of stated philosophy by requiring unit commanders to post written sexual assault policy statements that contain verbiage that reinforces commitment to eliminating sexual assault.⁶²

Leaders at all levels must continue to use embedded and reinforcing mechanisms in order to facilitate the change in culture because changing culture in a large historic organization is not a small project. The SHARP campaign emphasizes achieving cultural change by designating its importance in Phase III (Achieve Cultural Change).⁶³ It takes a considerable amount of time and constant effort from stakeholders to achieve a change in culture; however, the Army continues to make progress in anchoring approaches in accordance with Kotter's final step to leading change and Schein's cultural mechanisms.

Recommendations

This paper's first recommendation is for the Army to clearly develop and then communicate SHARP's vision. A way to achieve this recommendation is to follow an example from the Navy's SAPR office, which drafted a Sexual Assault Preventions and

Response Strategic roadmap FY13-FY15 document.⁶⁴ This document clearly articulates the Navy's vision, mission, and strategic priorities. The Army SHARP should develop a similar document as a resource to clearly articulate the Army's future vision, link it more directly with the strategy, and then fully communicate their message internally and externally.

The paper's second recommendation is to improve on ways to target the Reserve Component due to the geographical dispersed of their members. One way to accomplish this is to be more active in using social media. A Media outlet such as SHARP Facebook page has been established; however, as discussed earlier there is minimal activity on the site. In addition, the SHARP media team should increase the showing of sexual assault public service announcements in demographic markets that have a strong contingency of Reserve Component Soldiers.

The paper's third recommendation is to enhance training by incorporating excerpts from the movie "The Invisible War" into both active duty and reserve component training events. Hearing the accounts from sexual assault victims has the real possibility of making more of impact and can truly inspire someone to intervene. This movie may also foster more dialogue among Soldiers at all levels to have a more open and comprehensive discussion of this complex issue. In addition, Army policy should mandate sensitivity training for those accused of harassment or behavior that could lead to harassment. This additional training may prevent that behavior from escalating to a sexual assault incident.

The paper's last recommendation is for the Army Reserve Component to add comments about sexual assault to next year's Annual Posture Statement. A review of

all three component's 2012 Posture Statements revealed the fact that the Army Reserve was the only component that did not address sexual assault. Addressing sexual assault in the Posture Statement will promote leader emphasis on the problem to the audience internal to the organization as well as external audiences.

Conclusion

Overall, the Army and the SHARP office have demonstrated many of the key aspects of Kotter's eight-step process for effectively leading change in an organization. The Army has taken many initiatives since the very important 2008 Risk Reduction and Training Summit and expanded the various communication events associated with the I. A.M. Strong Campaign. The Army has displayed many of the cultural embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to change its culture in the long term. However, this assessment identified four areas the Army can improve upon in order to be more effective in the future. The assessment showed the SHARP program office has not clearly defined its vision to the members of the Army, which then needs to be linked with its strategy. While the lack of a clear vision did not prevent the program from developing and communicating a strategy; however, improvement in communicating the strategy through more aggressive use of media, such as Facebook and movies to the active component, and more importantly to the Reserve Component as they are more dispersed throughout the country. Finally, the Chief of Army Reserves needs to address this program in its annual Posture Statement. If the Army leadership and SHARP office addresses these recommendations, the program should be more effective in the future.

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